Tuesday, November 19, 2013

Contesting worldviews, interpreted via their own legacy

Has the ancient world become the meme of the moment? Following fast upon Mary Beard's book, the WSJ offers yet another review shared by Jutta. The book is The Cave and the Light by Arthur Herman. According to reviewer Roger Kimball:
Mr. Herman takes the reader on a rollicking trip from classical Athens to 21st-century New York to make the case that "everything we say, do, and see" has been shaped—"in one way or another"—by the ideas of Plato or Aristotle.

The book covers a good deal of later ground in its 675 pages. Later in the review, the age-old contrast of the two philosophers is sketched out:
Early on, Mr. Herman cannily observes that "one of the most crucial differences" between Plato and Aristotle is that Plato is backward-looking, Aristotle forward-looking. It is striking, for example, that Plato should describe knowledge as a sort of anamnesis, "recollection." There is something deeply nostalgic about Platonism: homesickness elevated to metaphysical longing. Aristotle, though, is at home in this world. "All men by nature desire to know," he says at the beginning of the "Metaphysics," "and the proof of this is the delight we take in our senses." For Aristotle, the senses don't so much beguile us, as in Plato, as they provide a window on the world and hence a means of liberation.
And of interest to us, in light of the Hippolytus's obsessive concern with the word:
. . . what makes "The Cave and the Light" so enjoyable is Mr. Herman's command of that most uncommon virtue, common sense. "Balance"—what Aristotle called sophrosune—stands at the top of his list of virtues. And although he insists that sanity and balance require the spiritualizing impetus of Plato as well as the pragmatic outlook of Aristotle, it is clear that he harbors a partiality for the latter.
 Another notice of the book is here, courtesy of the American Enterprise Institute,with a lecture by the author. 

Sunday, November 17, 2013

A review of Mary Beard's new book

Jutta sends along this review of Mary Beard's new book, Confronting the Classics. It sounds like a fun read - the sort of thing that would provoke undead minds to find out more about those whose cultural value has, for the past 70 years or so been marked more in the breach than the observance.


A Minoan fresco from Knossos, Greece, known as the 'Ladies in Blue,' which dates from 1500 B.C. but was extensively restored in the early 1900s. The Bridgeman Art Gallery

If her intent - and Beard is a highly regarded classicist at Cambridge -  is to stimulate interest, hoping that a virus of curiosity might prod schools and media mavens to give the Classics a tad more centrality, or at least visibility, then of course more power to her. She does seem to be aiming beyond the heads of those already enchanted by, or receiving a salary for expertise related to, the "ancient" Greeks and Romans -- no mean feat, and a generous thing for a scholar to do.

What might not be quite so strongly emphasized in Beard's book -- I can't tell from the review, but will be curious to discover -- is an argument we don't hear so much any more: That the Classics are always current, always central to our languages, our words, syntax, rhetorical susceptibilities, logical powers, scientific interests. The classics are the wellspring of our underlying vernacular: we can not say "logic" without invoking, as from Olympus, the richly shared semantic burden of the λόγος of Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle. The fact that some folks might have neither read nor even heard of these Greek authors carries no weight -- when one says "logic," one summons a symposium living on in the λόγος -- a lively 2500-year conversation going on within the philology of that word to this day.

The classics won't be irrelevant or otherwise superfluous so long as we insist on attempting to apply reason to our world. It would be like trying to walk without feet - or better, without the gravity that keeps us grounded as well as able to stand, move, and look around us. As much as we might consider Socrates rather out of date, at some moment, in the αγορά of daily interaction, the smile of his awe at our all-knowing modernity could cease to flatter. In that moment, we might learn to see ourselves with a bit more classical candor, and share a bit of his good humor.

Thursday, November 14, 2013

Euripides and Aristotle palimpsests found

Using cutting-edge technology, European scientists have uncovered new fragments by Euripides and an unknown ancient commentary on Aristotle. These writings were on parchments that were washed off and overwritten in medieval times.  
Using advanced multispectral imaging methods, the Palamedes project, based out of the Universities of Göttingen and Bologna were able to see the original writings in the manuscripts, one of which is located at the library of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Jerusalem, while the other can be found at the National Library of France in Paris. 
More here.

Monday, November 11, 2013

Euripides' Hippolytus and the powers of fiction

Before Theseus explicitly remands Hippolytus into exile, saying,
Go forth from this land with all speed as an exile, and come no more either to god-built Athens [975] or to the borders of any land ruled by my spear.
Right before saying this, he points to the unimpeachable evidence, the witness whose testimony is irrefutable:
. . . but why do I wage this contest against your speech when this corpse, witness most reliable, lies near?
τί ταῦτα σοῖς ἁμιλλῶμαι λόγοις νεκροῦ παρόντος μάρτυρος ;
We must consider the irony that Hippolytus, who wanted to suppress all women's voices, is here condemned by the "clearest," or "most reliable" [σαφεστάτου] words of a woman who is not merely isolated from all other women. Phaedra, though dead, has testified so authoritatively that Theseus sees any mitigation of the harsh sentence of banishment as tantamount to giving his entire life the lie:
if I am to be bested by you when you have done this to me, Isthmian Sinis shall no longer attest [μαρτυρήσει] that I killed him but say it was an idle boast, and the Skironian rocks near the sea [980] shall deny that I am a scourge to evil-doers.
This is another one of those moments when Euripides takes his theatrical creation to the limit. Just as Hippolytus gets so carried away by his scheme of using wild animals to inhibit women's speech in the city -- a suggestion so ludicrous as to nearly bring laughter -- so here, Theseus, whose entire life story is filled with fabulous tales, says that his own literary identity would be destroyed if he failed to be consistent with it.

It's a bit like Don Quixote in the second volume of Don Quixote having to grapple with the fabled Name he has acquired as a result of a book about his knightly adventures being read by his neighbors. Theseus, a figure of myth, here argues that he must condemn his son because if he did not, the dead monsters of his fables would rise and give him, as we say, the lie. He would no longer be Theseus the slayer of monsters, he would be someone pretending to be that fictional figure. A fictional figure in a play is claiming that if he does not act in accord with his fictional tales, he will be seen to be a fiction.

Theseus, in a sense, would evaporate -- as would the play -- if the spell of the performance were shattered by pointing to itself as a piece of theatrical fiction. The place where this happens in Greek theater is not usually in tragedy, but comedy. At certain moments in the work of Aristophanes, the characters leave and the chorus steps forward (parabanein) and speaks to the audience. The disruption is radical, as the chorus doesn't even talk about things or persons in the play we are watching. This is called the parabasis:
In Greek comedy, the parabasis (plural parabases; Ancient Greek: παράβασις, plural: παραβάσεις) is a point in the play when all of the actors leave the stage and the chorus is left to address the audience directly. The chorus partially or completely abandons its dramatic role to talk to the audience on a topic completely irrelevant to the subject of the play. 
For example, in the play The Wasps by Aristophanes the first parabasis is about Aristophanes' career as a playwright to date, while the second parabasis is shorter, and contains a string of in-jokes about local characters who would be well known to the ancient Athenian audience (e.g. the politician Cleon).
This breaking of the frame, of the illusion's fourth wall, is not unfamiliar to fans of U.S. comedy. Think of George Burns' direct comments to the viewer about the goings-on with Gracie in Burns and Allen, or the hilarious disruptions of story lines found in the films of Mel Brooks, committed by Mel Brooks. The moment they step outside the frame of the fiction and speak as themselves, we laugh as the illusion explodes.


When Theseus claims that Sciron would come alive to testify that he was never killed by Theseus, he is stretched nearly to the edge of his reality. Indeed, if the rocks testify that he was not a scourge -- βαρύν - to evil-doers, they are saying something like this: The root meaning of βαρύν is "weight," or "heaviness," which then extends to the sense of "grievous, stern, strict, deep, serious."

If Sciron's rocks, which are certainly heavy, were to deny Theseus's solid, massive seriousness, then suddenly he and the play itself would lose gravity. Euripidean tragedy is not at the opposite extreme from comedy, it is uncannily near by.

This adjacency becomes more relevant in light of the fact that Theseus is asserting the validity, legitimacy and truth of his own history at the same instant that he is denying all weight to the history and reality of his own son. Standing "face to face" with Hippolytus, Theseus sees only a fiction, a figment invented by Phaedra. The Hippolytus whom Theseus and all of us have known, the priggish devotee of Artemis, is a lie, a thing of no weight, annihilated by the the dead woman's script. The true boy is the lying bastard who raped his father's wife; nothing that he can bear witness to or do will make any difference.

At this moment, Theseus does not step forward, disrupting the scene with some comedic gag that would explode the tensions and gravitas of the play into a shambles. But he almost has. Though he mocks Hippolytus for reading books, Phaedra's little book is as real to him as the tales of Sinis and Sciron. The power of this corpse, witness most reliable, compels Theseus to expel Hippolytus, to put him outside the boundaries of Athens and Troezen forever (symmetrically reversing Hippolytus's expressed wish to banish all women).

Weightless, Hippolytus is sent beyond the fourth wall, outside the framed space of the play and of the state. To his father and friends, it is as if he were to fly off the face of the Earth. States and tragedies cannot exist without gravity, Euripides appears to say. The continuity of the spectacle of Theseus, of the State, and of the Hippolytus is protected, but at a very high cost.

Tuesday, November 05, 2013

The spectacle of hamartia

"Hamartia cannot be sharply defined or have an exact meaning assigned to it." WP
The audience knows before he opens his mouth that the first words Theseus speaks to Hippolytus will redound with unforgiving irony upon his own judgment:
Theseus
O foolish mankind, so often missing the mark (ἁμαρτάνοντες), why do you teach crafts (τέχνας) numberless and contrive and invent all things when there is one thing you do not understand and have not hunted after, [920] how to teach the senseless to be sensible! (φρονεῖν διδάσκειν οἷσιν οὐκ ἔνεστι νοῦς;)
Hippolytus
A formidable expert (σοφιστὴν) this, who is able to force (ἀναγκάσαι) insensate fools to show sense. But since these fine-spun disputations of yours, father, are unseasonable, I fear that your misfortunes have caused your tongue to run amok (ὑπερβάλλῃ).
Theseus
[925] Ah, but there ought to be for mortals some reliable test (τεκμήριον σαφές) for friends, some way to know their minds (διάγνωσιν φρενῶν), which of them is a true friend and which is not, and each man ought to have two voices (δισσάς τε φωνὰς), the one a voice of justice, the other whatever he chanced to have, [930] so that the voice that thinks unjust thoughts would be convicted of falsehood by the just voice. And in this way we should never be deceived.
Hippolytus
But has one of my kin been slandering (διαβαλὼν) me in your ear and are my fortunes diseased though I have done nothing amiss? I am astonished. (ἐκπλήσσουσί) [935] Your words, cast adrift  from all sense, (λόγοι παραλλάσσοντες ἔξεδροι φρενῶν) astonish me.

Theseus has read Phaedra's letter and already pronounced judgment upon his son before Hippolytus joins him at the scene in his bedroom. But it takes a while for this to be made clear to Hippolytus. It's noteworthy how much this first exchange between father and son concerns itself with language, with the use and abuse of words, of λόγοι.

In this world, to speak Greek is both an intentional act and an athletic one. You throw words, and they either hit or miss their mark. The first thing Theseus says to Hippolytus is a general comment that the general run of mankind is always missing the mark: hamartia: 

O foolish mankind, so often missing the mark (ἁμαρτάνοντες)
Hippolytus responds that Theseus's words go wide of the mark, they are ὑπερβάλλῃ, thrown too far, hyperbolic. Theseus retorts with a generic wish that inventive mankind would discover a tool, basically a bullshit detector. Men would from that point on have two voices, one that is audibly just, a second that is whatever chance provides. Theseus is proposing that someone invent a means of making hamartia visible, or at least audible. Never in his life could he put such a device to better use than now, as he is about to turn every spontaneous expression of surprise, every protest of innocence, every sign of felt care offered by his son into the charade of a hypocrite, an actor, a charlatan.

Hippolytus offers the hypothesis that some friend of his has slandered him. His word is diaballein, a rich word, yet another ballistic variant. The speaker is intentionally throwing lies. It's not entirely surprising that the Greek word took a diabolical turn, becoming the root of "devil," the father of lies. It's only by some such misrepresentation that Theseus's words could be so far from home, says Hippolytus:
Your words, cast adrift  from all sense, λόγοι παραλλάσσοντες ἔξεδροι φρενῶν
Words that are παραλλάσσοντες deviate from one another. One image used in defining this word is to visualize two tunnels being dug toward each other, but missing, failing to hit the mark. To be parallel, in this case, is to never meet. Words that are doomed to never meet the mark are ἔξεδροι, away from home.

Hippolytus, who has yet to learn he has been sentenced to exile, finds his father's words to be strange, extravagant, far from home. When their encounter ends, he'll ask, "will you throw me out" (ἐκβαλεῖς): 
ἄκριτον ἐκβαλεῖς με γῆς;
Will you banish me without a trial?
The encounter between father and son takes the form of argument and counterargument, fueled with all the rhetorical arts of the very best lawyers. If we ask why Euripides chooses to frame this act of judgment as a trial, it helps to see how the play addresses both the private and public realms of oikos -- the familial home and the Royal House -- at once.

Implicit in this superposition of House and home is a syllogism: If a father can so misjudge his own son, despite every opportunity to interrogate the accused, what sort of bullshit detectors will help the state? If humans are subject to radical uncertainty in judging their nearest kin, with what level of confidence can we rely on the state to "get to the bottom of things" and administer justice? If the most momentous acts of judgment hang upon what is sense-less -- what cannot be sensed with the clarity of Theseus's reliable test, his τεκμήριον σαφές, or any concrete, empirical, sensory datum of proof, then we might want to revisit our understanding of how Euripides understood "tragedy." 

In the Hippolytus at least, the spectacle of hamartia is not about some character who happens to be "tragically flawed." The "of" turns out to be genitive: tragedy is not a representation of -- i.e. a story about -- this or that flaw or error. Rather the spectacle is error's own child --that imitation of an action we call life:


1110


men's life is a shifting thing, ever unstable.
shifting, wandering forever.

Monday, November 04, 2013

Painful understanding: The Chorus speaks with difficulty

At the end of Hippolytus Scene 5, Hippolytus exits, having been banished by Theseus for the alleged rape of Phaedra. The chorus now sings an ode that offers some interpretive difficulties. Kovacs' version is considerably different from that of Grene, and the French translation offers yet a different rendering.

The difficulties are mainly in the first two stanzas. I've appended the third anyway, but it's less controversial, and left off the two remaining stanzas. The differences between Grene and Kovacs will be clear when compared.

It's been noted that the first and third stanzas have masculine participles; those of the second and fourth are feminine. One suggestion is that although Hippolytus has left to go into exile, some from his band of friends remain to sing this together with the women of Troezen, alternating, but this is conjecture.

In any event, the ode is suggestive and elusive, but the emotional tone becomes clearer as it moves towards its conclusion - the fifth stanza ends:

ὦ τάλαινα μᾶ-
1145τερ, ἔτεκες ἀνόνατα: φεῦ:
μανίω θεοῖσιν.
ἰὼ ἰώ:
συζύγιαι Χάριτες, τί τὸν τάλαν᾽ ἐκ πατρίας γᾶς
οὐδὲν ἄτας αἴτιον
1150πέμπετε τῶνδ᾽ ἀπ᾽ οἴκων;
O unhappy mother, [1145] it was to no purpose that you bore him. Oh, I am angry with the gods! Ye Graces that dance your round, why do you not accompany this man from this house? He has been ruined by his father's wrath [1150] but is guiltless of no mad deed.

Canova: Charites

Here are the first three stanzas by Kovacs, followed by the French:

Χορός
ἦ μέγα μοι τὰ θεῶν μελεδήμαθ᾽, ὅταν φρένας ἔλθῃ,
1105λύπα παραιρεῖ ξύνεσίς τε: τίς ἐλπὶς ἃ κεύθει
λείπεται ἔν τε τύχαις θνατῶν καὶ ἐν ἔργμασι λεύσσειν;
ἄλλα γὰρ ἄλλοθεν ἀμείβεται, μετὰ δ᾽ ἵσταται ἀνδράσιν αἰὼν
1110πολυπλάνητος αἰεί.
Thoughts about the gods, when they come into my mind, are banished by painful understanding: [1105] what hope is there left to see their hidden workings in the fortunes and doings of mortals? For from one quarter comes one thing and from another another, and men's life is a shifting thing, [1110] ever unstable.
εἴθε μοι εὐξαμένᾳ θεόθεν τάδε μοῖρα παράσχοι,
τύχαν μετ᾽ ὄλβου καὶ ἀκήρατον ἄλγεσι θυμόν.
1115δόξα δὲ μήτ᾽ ἀτρεκὴς μήτ᾽ αὖ παράσημος ἐνείη,
ῥᾴδια δ᾽ ἤθεα τὸν αὔριον μεταβαλλομένα χρόνον αἰεὶ
βίον συνευτυχοίην
O that in answer to my prayer fate might give me this gift from the gods, a lot of blessedness and a heart untouched by sorrow! [1115] No mind unswerving and obdurate would I have nor yet again one false-struck, but changing my pliant character ever for the morrow I would share the morrow's happiness my whole life through.
οὐκέτι γὰρ καθαρὰν φρέν᾽ ἔχω, παρὰ δ᾽ ἐλπίδ᾽ ἃ λεύσσω,
ἐπεὶ τὸν Ἑλλανίας φανερώτατον ἀστέρ᾽ Ἀθήνας
εἴδομεν εἴδομεν ἐκ πατρὸς ὀργᾶς
1125ἄλλαν ἐπ᾽ αἶαν ἱέμενον.
ὦ ψάμαθοι πολιήτιδος ἀκτᾶς,
ὦ δρυμὸς ὄρεος, ὅθι κυνῶν
ὠκυπόδων μέτα θῆρας ἔναιρεν
1130Δίκτυνναν ἀμφὶ σεμνάν.
[1120] For my mind is no longer untroubled but beyond all expectation are the things I look upon. We have seen Greece's fairest star, have seen him go forth sped by his father's wrath [1125] to another land. O sands of our city's shore, o mountain thickets where with his swift hounds he slew the wild beasts [1130] in company with holy Dictynna!


LE CHOEUR

[1104] La sollicitude des dieux, lorsqu'elle revient à mon esprit, me délivre de bien des inquiétudes : mais quand je crois comprendre leur providence, cet espoir m'abandonne, aussitôt que j'envisage le sort et les actions des mortels ; car ils sont le jouet de continuelles vicissitudes, et la vie humaine est en proie à une éternelle instabilité.

Que la divine destinée accorde à mes prières une fortune qui suffise au bonheur, un cœur exempt de soucis, une renommée qui ne soit ni trop éclatante, ni trop obscure ; changeant chaque jour mes mœurs faciles, puissé-je passer une vie heureuse avec ceux qui m'entourent !

[1120] Mais cette sérénité ne règne plus dans mon cœur, et mes espérances sont déçues, depuis que nous avons vu l'astre brillant d'Athènes exilé par l'ordre d'un père irrité. Ô rivages de Trézène, ô forêts, ô montagnes, où, avec ses chiens agiles, il poursuivait les animaux sauvages, à la suite de la chaste Diane !